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1 Introduction
The expression "clash of civilizations" or "clash of cultures" has become a
winged word after the attacks on the twin towers on 11 September 2001.
Originally brought up as term by the historian Bernard Lewis1 the expres-
sion was made famous by Huntingtons book "The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of a World Order" (1996). His main hypothesis is that the fun-
damental source of conict in the post cold war period will be along cultural
and religious lines. In his words: "The fault lines between civilizations will be
the battle lines of the future" (Huntington 1993). In particular, Huntington
claims that "Islam has bloody borders" and predicts prevalent civilizational
conict between Muslims and non-Muslims. The debate surrounding Hunt-
ingtons work has received a sense of urgency after the September 11 attacks.
Its merit has been debated both because of the di¢ culty of dening a "civ-
ilization"2 and doubt about its empirical validity.3 However, it is hard to
deny that religion and culture are important ingredients in conict and that
religious categories in particular have been used in (shocking) regularity by
perpetrators of violence.4 The term "clash of civilizations" has entered com-
mon vocabulary and plays an important role in framing the political debate
on a whole range of issues from terrorism to cultural stereotypes.5
The main question we aim to answer here is why existing cultural cat-
egories (religious categories in particular) become so salient and conictive.
In order to do so we model the competition between two existing cultures
from both the demand and supply side of culture. In this model the clash
of civilizations is a clash of perspectives. Individuals in di¤erent cultures
1Lewis used the term rst in his article in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic
Monthly titled "The Roots of Muslim Rage".
2Some issues raised are that Huntingtons classication overlooks internal di¤erences
among civilizations (Berman, 2003b) and that identity is a choice and not destiny (Sen,
2006).
3There is a huge literature refuting di¤erent aspects of Huntingtons work. Fox (2001)
shows that a perception of a clash could come from the Western perspective on the sample
of conicts. Inglehart and Norris (2002, 2003) and Chaney (2012) provide evidence that
there is no cultural mechanism that links Islam to a distaste for democracy.
4Inglehart and Norris (2002, 2003) show a cultural divide between the West and Is-
lam on issues of gender roles. For civil wars between 1940 and 2000, Toft (2006, 2007)
establishes the increasingly important role of religion.
5Al Jazeera Television, for example, broadcasted a Featured Doc-
umentary called: "The 9/11 Decade. The Clash of Civilizations?"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fIhTBEUr_80
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disagree fundamentally about what constitutes cultural value. We show that
those supplying culture (cultural leaders), can have an interest to reinforce
this divide in ways that harm welfare. We discuss the conditions that lead to
this particular principal-agent problem and illustrate our analysis with the
example of religion.
To model the demand side of culture we adopt the framework of cultural
transmission of preferences by Bisin and Verdier (2001). In this framework
parents maximize the utility of their children by choosing a costly educational
e¤ort that determines the probability that the parents transmit their cultural
trait to the child. At the core of this model stands a central assumption.
Parents of di¤erent traits (cultures) systematically di¤er in their evaluation
of cultures. The view on a culture from the inside is more positive than
the view from the outside. Educational e¤ort is then driven by high benets
from their own culture and the fear that the child will be worse o¤ in another
culture. We argue that these incentive devices directly correspond to cultural
concepts like heaven and hell.
Cultural leaders supply culture. They do this by interpreting their own
culture, interpreting other cultures and representing their own culture to-
wards other cultures. The fact that culture is changing and adapting gives
leaders the freedom to change the character of culture through their actions.
We analyze the incentives of cultural leaders in light of the recent litera-
ture on intrinsic motivation. We nd that under realistic assumptions on
the motives of leaders their optimal interpretation of culture might deviate
systematically from the welfare maximum for the population. We show that
unlike a social planner who would only allow for the provision of cultural
benets, cultural leaders will stir the fear of conversions - for example, by
stressing negative or simply incompatible elements of other cultures. More
surprisingly, cultural leaders can benet from stressing these same elements
in their own culture towards the outside. We argue that this cross-cutting
interest in exaggerating incompatibility can explain religious conict in par-
ticular. Even related and very similar beliefs can appear incompatible and
divisive if di¤erences receive all the attention.6
But why is the population unable to defend its own interests against their
leaders? One of the main reasons is the lack of information. Moreover, leaders
can strategically use the past behavior of both the ingroup and the outgroup
6Examples are the, often violent, conicts between Protestants and Catholics or be-
tween Sunnis and Shiites.
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to feed low intercultural perceptions. Competition among leaders is unlikely
to help, since in a world where cultural categorizations are hard to avoid
the nature of competition is likely to be external and not internal. While
internal competition for leadership might reduce the use of aggressive clash
strategies, external competition (launching a new trait) is likely to intensify
the clash.
Economic factors are an important restriction on the strategy of leaders.
We show that raising the fear of conversion in other groups is not a feasible
strategy if the leaders group is economically very disadvantaged or if this
reduces the economic opportunities of the leaders group. We also study
a scenario where economic payo¤s depend endogenously on the degree of
cultural diversity in society. We do so by allowing for network e¤ects. If
network e¤ects are only present in the economically disadvantaged cultural
group - e.g. there is an immigrant network providing some economic benets
- this allows their leader to be culturally more aggressive.
Instead of manipulating actual and perceived benets from a particular
trait, cultural leaders might manipulate the salience of di¤erent identities. In
an extension, we modify our model to allow people to have a citizen identity
common to the whole society and a group-specic identity (i.e. religion,
family origins etc.). We show that leaders of an economically disadvantaged
group always want to increase group salience and hence induce a cultural
clash. We also show that leaders of the economically advantaged group might
want to play along. Group members can also benet from an increased
salience of their group identities but only if these are linked to su¢ ciently
large positive cultural values. If cultural fears are strong, group members
su¤er from an increase in group salience.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we set up the basic model. Section 3 contains our main results on cultural
leaders and the clash of civilizations. In section 4 we discuss political re-
strictions on cultural leaders focusing on the role of asymmetric information
and competition between leaders. Section 5 is dedicated to the interaction
of economic opportunities with cultural manipulations. In section 6 we de-
velop the model with multiple identities where leaders choose the salience of
group-specic identity versus citizen identity. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The Model Set-Up
We use a simple model with existing cultural traits to model how di¤erences
between these traits become amplied. We rst present an adaptation of
Bisin and Verdiers (2001) model of cultural transmission. In this model the
demand for a culture is driven by its benets compared to other cultures. In
subsection 2.2 we introduce cultural leaders who supply culture and shape its
character. We argue that these leaders have an incentive to amplify cultural
di¤erences.
In what follows we will use (monotheistic) religion as our leading example
for culture. This is because of the importance that religion plays in the
discussion of the clash of civilizations. However, it should be kept in mind
that our model can apply more broadly.
2.1 The Demand for Cultural Transmission
A society of size 1 has two possible cultural traits, trait 1 and trait 2. The
fraction of individuals having trait 1 is q and the fraction of individuals
having trait 2 is 1   q. We follow Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) in the way
overlapping generations are modeled: a Poisson birth and death process keeps
the population size of active agents constant.7
Parents choose their education e¤ort di which determines the probabil-
ity that their child will adopt their culture. We assume that the costs of
education are C(di) = 12d
2
i . One should think of this costs as the cost of
submerging the child into the values provided by cultural leaders. It includes
fees charged by the leader and the opportunity costs of time spent in ex-
posing the child to the culture. If this submergence fails, the child bumps
into a randomly chosen member of the parents society and copies her pref-
erences. With probability q it then adopts culture 1 and with probability
1  q it adopts culture 2. This way of cultural transmission captures the role
of society in shaping an individuals culture.
We assume that parents have imperfect empathy: they evaluate their
childs future utility through the structure of values in their own culture.
7The survival probability of an active agent is  each period. With probability 1  an
active agent has a child without any predetermined preferences who will becomes active
the next period. For simplicity we look at life-time values. This saves on notation. If we
only looked at per period values everything would have to be multiplied by 11  to get
life-time utilities.
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We assume that from the perspective of group i culture j provides utility
uij, i; j 2 f1; 2g : Imperfect empathy means that culture is seen di¤erently
from outside than from inside i.e. uii 6= uji for i 2 f1; 2g and j 6= i and
that the own culture is perceived as superior: uii > uij.8 This di¤erence
in perception can be driven by information and di¤erences in tastes alike.
Imperfect empathy seems particularly realistic in the case of religious beliefs.
Typically, belief in one god implies that following another god will harm
welfare. Yet, groups with di¤erent, often contradictory, beliefs live together
in a society.
Apart from culture the utility of parents is also a¤ected by the economic
opportunities of their o¤springs. We assume that these are objective, i.e. the
perspective on economic opportunities is independent of the parents culture.
Life-time economic opportunities are denoted by wi where i refers to the cul-
ture of the child. We assume that w1  w2 and will therefore call trait 1 the
economically advantaged and trait 2 the economically disadvantaged group.9
This assumption can reect two di¤erent economic environments: (i) every-
body works in the same sector but culture 2 is economically disadvantaged
either due to wage discrimination or due to some cultural elements leading
to lower productivity, (ii) the di¤erent traits work in separated sectors and
the sector of culture 2 is less productive.
A parent from the economically advantaged group (culture 1) solves
max
d1
d1 (u11 + w1) + (1  d1) (q (u11 + w1) + (1  q) (u12 + w2))  1
2
d21 (1)
where the rst term reects a direct educational success of exposing the child
to culture 1 while the second term is the expected utility when education fails.
Equivalently a parent of the economically disadvantaged group (culture
2) maximizes
max
d2
d2 (u22 + w2) + (1  d2) ((1  q) (u22 + w2) + q (u21 + w1))  1
2
d22: (2)
It is straightforward to show that the optimal education e¤ort is
d1 = 1(1  q) (3)
d2 = 2q (4)
8In sociology this assumption is called ethnocentrism, the belief in the superiority of
ones own ethnic group or culture.
9A leader who maximizes overall income but has no impact on wages would therefore
try to reduce the size of group 2.
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where the parameters
1  u11   u12 + w1   w2 (5)
and
2  u22   u21 + w2   w1 (6)
summarize the overall motivation of parents of culture 1 and 2 to demand
cultural education for their children.
For cultural survival of the economically disadvantaged group to be pos-
sible it has be true that 2 > 0. The fear of culture 2 parents that their
children exit their culture has to compensate the wage di¤erential if the eco-
nomically disadvantaged culture is to survive in the long run. In order to
focus on the interesting case with two groups we assume that 2 > 0.
The population dynamics in terms of group size of the economically ad-
vantaged group is given by:
qt+1 = qt + (1  )qt((d1 + (1  d1)qt) + (1  qt)(1  d2))
or equivalently
qt+1   qt = (1  )qt(1  qt)(d1   d2)
Hence in steady state
0 = (1  )q(1  q)(d1   d2)
which has three rest points, q = 0 and q = 1 and the interior rest point
d1 = d2 which by Proposition 1 in Bisin and Verdier (2001) is the only stable
rest point. Hence the stable steady state is determined by
d1 = 1 (1  q) = 2q = d2: (7)
In other words, the educational e¤ort of parents is decreasing in the size of
their group.
The steady state size of the economically advantaged group is given by
q =
1
1 + 2
: (8)
Intuitively the equilibrium size of the economically advantaged group is in-
creasing in the extent of its economic advantage (wage discrimination against
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group 2) and the cultural dislike of the the economically advantaged group
towards the economically disadvantaged group.
The demand for cultural education can then be written as functions of the
underlying parameters summarized in 1 and 2: Steady state per capita
demand for cultural education is given by
d1 = d

2 =
12
1 + 2
: (9)
which is increasing in 1 and 2.
2.2 The Supply Side of Culture
In our model culture is distributed by professional agents who also develop or
interpret the culture they are spreading. Leaders hold some political power
that allows them to further their own interest.10 In what follows we will
take this interest to be non-economic, i.e. we assume that leaders take their
mission seriously. Our results are strengthened if leaders are motivated by
economic factors.
We assume that cultural leaders a¤ect the values u11; u12; u22 and u21.
They do so by interpreting and highlighting existing cultural aspects of their
own and other cultures. Part of this interpretation can also be the provision of
services complementary to a culture. For example, the provision of wedding
services by a priest of religion i increases the benet uii:A sermon by the same
priest which explains that believers in j go to hell lowers uij. It is important
to note that these assumptions capture essential elements of culture. Culture
is always a value and a viewpoint at same time. Whoever supplies culture
also supplies a way to interpret reality.11
The second role of cultural leaders is the distribution of culture. We as-
sume that cultural leaders spread culture because they see it as a public good.
In other words, cultural leaders are intrinsically motivated. Intrinsic motiva-
tion can be distinguished in "warm glow" and "public good" motivation.12
We will present these di¤erent motivations focusing on the economically dis-
advantaged group (culture 2) and analyze the incentives of their leader.
10See the discussion in Chaney (2011) for some evidence and a review of the literature.
11In this feature our model provides a explanation of ethnocentrism. For an alternative
see, for example, Hammond and Axelrod (2006).
12For a recent empirical study on the underlying neuro economics see Harbaugh et al
(2007).
8
Warm glow is the direct psychological benet from being actively involved
in the provision of a public good. In the case of a cultural leader the warm
glow benet will be given by the number of people the culture is successfully
distributed to. Under this assumption cultural leaders therefore maximize
the expected number of successful transmissions. For leader 2 this can be
expressed as the number of parents in the community, (1  q), times the
probability of transmission, d2;
U2 (warmglow) = d

2 (1  q) = 2q (1  q) : (10)
In the example of religion this can be thought of as the number of conver-
sions triggered by the leaders actions. If the leader is a Christian priest then
this would be the number of children in his community that are conrmed.
The main alternative is that leaders receive a benet from the overall level
of cultural transmissions - regardless of whether they were directly involved
or not. This attitude leads them to internalize the transmissions due to
random encounters later in life which means that the utility function of the
leader of group 2 in this case is simply the size of his group
U2 (publicgood) = 1  q: (11)
It is important to stress that payments to the leader (resulting from ed-
ucational costs) would lead to a similar utility functions for cultural leaders.
If leaders are motivated by rents that are generated from the parents e¤orts
(like fees for religious schooling) then this can be captured by a warm glow
utility in equation (10).13 If leaders are motivated by the overall income
generated by their group then they would maximize group size as suggested
by equation (11).
To summarize, leader 2 maximizes equation (10) (equation (11)) through
his impact on u11; u12; u22 and u21. It makes sense to illustrate this impact in
the light of our leading example: religion. The positive e¤ects of religion on
well-being are well documented. In our model these positive e¤ects of religion
2 are captured by u22. If religion was an objective truth linked to a bundle
of veriable services then the value of u22 could simply be regarded as the
direct benet that "consumers" of faith 2 receive from the services provided
by leader 2. We would then have u21 = u11 and u12 = u22. It is easy to show
that then either 1 < 0 or 2 < 0: One religion would disappear in the long
run.
13For a detailed discussion of economic rents see Hauk and Mueller (2011).
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Religious diversity in the model is explained by the fact that believers in
religion 1 and 2 will disagree fundamentally regarding their evaluations of
the two religions. We argue that some of this disagreement is a¤ected by the
actions of cultural leaders. For example, leaders interpret existing religious
texts and provide their interpretation of present day situations. Their specic
knowledge gives them some credibility when addressing their community.
Leaders are therefore able to give their own interpretation to their religion
and draw their community into this interpretation. Some leaders will focus
on generating benets (raise u22) while others might attack other faiths or
simply condemn the disbelievers (lower u21).
In addition, leaders represent their religion towards the outside. The
pope is probably the most extreme example here as his word is taken as
representative for a large share of Christian believers. This makes leaders also
responsible for shaping the outside view on their religion. A public speech by
leader 2 that picks on sensitive issues in religion 1, for example, might lower
u12. This happened when Terry Jones, a pastor from Florida, announced
that he would burn the Quran on the 9th anniversary of September 11th.
Jones refrained from this announced burning. Nevertheless Jones held a
trial against the Quran in March 2011 where the Quran was condemned
and Jones oversaw its burning. The symbolism of burning the Quran let
to outrage amongst many Muslims. A more subtle e¤ect was that it made
Jonesreligion appear incompatible with Muslim beliefs.
The inuence of cultural leaders will be restricted by several factors.
Leaders are not totally free to choose values of uij but will typically build on
a history of interpretations and cultural services. In the following section we
will rst analyze the incentives of unconstrained leaders and compare these
to the welfare of the population. How these ndings translate into a more
realistic setup where leaders face restrictions is then discussed in Sections 4
and 5. Our explicit analysis will be derived for (the leader of) group 2, the
economically disadvantaged group.
3 Results with Unconstrained Leaders
We rst look at the leader of the economically disadvantaged group and
his incentive to change ingroup sentiments u22 and u21. For the time being
we take economic variables as given. The manipulation of the economic
opportunities of di¤erent traits will be discussed in section 5. As can be seen
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from the denition
2  u22   u21 + w2   w1
both an increase in the utility derived from the own culture, u22, and a
decrease in the perceived utility of a conversion, u21, increases 2 and hence
the demand for cultural education by group 2. Our model conrms that
increasing this perceived cultural di¤erence is always in the interest of the
leader of group 2.
Proposition 1 If cultural leaders of the economically disadvantaged group
can a¤ect u22 and u21 they will increase u22 and lower u21 - regardless of their
utility function. The economically disadvantaged population always benets
form an increase of u22 but su¤ers when u21 decreases.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The cultural leader has always an incentive to raise the perception of cul-
tural di¤erences as this motivates parents to educate their children (raises
2).14 An increase in the di¤erence can be either achieved through the provi-
sion of cultural values (raising u22) or through claims of cultural superiority
which make the other culture appear inferior (lowering u21). Both appear
symmetric from the point of view of the cultural leader - regardless of her
utility function.
This indi¤erence between increasing u22 and lowering u21 does not apply
to parents. Parents have to live with a chance that their children change cul-
ture. Low values of u21 imply that parents educate their children mostly out
of fear. High values of u22 mean that high perceived benets drive education.
Despite its simplicity our model provides a strong and robust message.
Fear can be in the interest of those driven by a religious mission - regardless
of whether this religious mission applies to the overall outcome or the leaders
direct inuence. Our model is particularly realistic for those leaders who are
not connected to the earthly interests of their community but focus on values
in the metaphysical religious world (saving souls). Communities prefer to be
motivated by the joy and fulllment that their religion provides.
If we take a narrow religious interpretation the model can be recast as
a belief in heaven and hell. Proposition 1 then shows that parents who are
14For the time being we ignore the cost side of the di¤erent strategies. Notice that for
costly changes in culture, the result can be interpreted as saying that cultural leaders will
maximize u22   u21 subject to the cost of producing the di¤erence.
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motivated by heaven benet from this belief. A family that is motivated
by the prospect of hell su¤ers. Brañas-Garza et al (2010) use a dataset of
35000 individuals from 32 countries who state both their beliefs and their
church attendance to test for asymmetries in the incentive e¤ects of heaven
and hell.15 Their data reveal that, rstly, the believers in hell are a subset
of those believing in heaven. Secondly, both explain some part of church
attendance with beliefs in heaven playing the more important role. In the
reading of proposition 1 this suggests a positive welfare e¤ect of religious
belief.
Up until now we focused on the inuence of the cultural leader on 2. As
explained in the previous section cultural leaders also represent their culture
towards the outside. This means the leader of culture 2 has inuence on
1  u11   u12 + w1   w2
through her inuence on how her culture is perceived by the outgroup: u12.
Surprisingly, the leader is not necessarily interested in making his culture
look good and might want to lower the cultural perception of the outgroup
towards the ingroup which we will refer to as cultural alienation.
Proposition 2 A decrease in u12 is the interest of the leader of culture 2 if
she is motivated by warm glow incentives and as long as group 2 is su¢ ciently
large (q < 1
2
). A decrease in u12 is never in the interest of a leader with
public good incentives and members of group 2.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 states that cultural leaders with warm glow motivations
can benet from alienating other cultures even though this strategy is clearly
harmful to their followers. In our model, alienation of the outgroup is in the
leaders interest because it leads to a new steady state in which increased fear
in the outgroup has spilled over into higher educational e¤ort in the ingroup.
The cost is a smaller group. The new steady state features less members of
group 2. This can be benecial for the leader if she prefers a small radical
group to a larger unmotivated group.16
15This data is taken from the module on National Identity of the 1998 International
Social Survey Program (ISSP): Religion II.
16The underlying mechanism is not unrealistic. Cohen-Zada (2006), for example, studies
enrollment rates in Catholic private schools. He nds a strongly concave relationship
between local enrollment in private Catholic schools and the share of Catholics in the
local population.
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Gould and Klor (2012) provide evidence for this mechanism. They study
hate crimes against Muslim immigrants in the US in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks. They exploit exogenous variations across states in
the number of crimes to show that Muslim immigrants living in states which
experienced the sharpest increase in hate crimes also experience the sharpest
increase in cultural e¤ort.17 The religious motives of the terrorists are well-
documented. It is a declared goal of al-Quaeda to bring more Muslims into
a radical version of Islam that follows the Sharia closely.
A leader with public good motivation represented by utility function (11)
does not benet directly from higher demand for her culture (d2). She only
cares about the total number of members in group 2 and therefore su¤ers a
loss if culture 1 is alienated. Members of group 2 do not su¤er directly but
because group 1 is alienated and therefore tries harder to prevent the spread
of culture 2. Increased e¤ort in group 1 makes group 2 lose members and the
remaining members have no choice but to put more e¤ort into education as
well.
A rst corollary from propositions 1 and 2 is that only an increase of
uii is benecial for society at large. This allows us to conclude immediately
that a social planner would only allow for the use of this channel and try to
get perceptions about the other culture as close as possible to its true value.
Without inherent taste di¤erences this always leads to either two completely
symmetric traits or to the survival of only one trait.
Leaders in the economically advantaged group have the same interests as
their peers in the economically disadvantaged group with similar e¤ects on
their group members.
Corollary 1 Cultural leaders of both cultural groups share an interest in
escalating fear of conversion. At least one leader always has an incentive to
alienate the outgroup.
According to corollary 1 cultural leaders have an incentive to provoke
intolerance and fear on both sides of an existing cultural boundary. This
provides a novel interpretation of the "clash of civilizations" and the role of
cultural leaders. The "clash" in our model is a clash of viewpoints on the
same culture - the view from inside and the view from outside. Proposition
1 shows that leaders generally have an incentive to make other cultures look
17The measures for cultural e¤ort are higher probability of within group marriages,
higher fertility rates, lower female labor force participation and lower English prociency.
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bad to discourage conversions. Proposition 2 shows that if leaders are warm
glow motivated they can also benet from making their own culture look bad
in the eyes of outsiders. Welfare falls with this exaggeration of di¤erences
and incompatibilities.18
How realistic is this in the context of religion? Proposition 2 shows that
a crucial question here is whether warm glow motivation is important for
religious leaders. A study of the psychology of religious leaders is beyond the
scope of this article. However, religious texts are full of promises of personal
rewards so that warm glow motivation is per se not an unrealistic assumption.
More importantly, perhaps, some religions contain more direct instructions.
For example, Matthew 28:19-20 states:
"19 Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in[a]
the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, 20 teaching
them to observe all that I have commanded you. And behold, I am with you
always, to the end of the age."
This passage is remarkable not only because it gives the instruction to
baptize and teach but because it establishes a direct link to a religious benet.
God is with those that baptize and teach his word. A strong belief in god
can therefore mean strong warm glow motivation to mission. If we take our
model literally then leaders of large Christian communities might have an
incentive to alienate other religions.
4 Political Restrictions on the Behavior of
Leaders
In this section we discuss political restrictions on the behavior of cultural
leaders. We rst explain why the control of cultural leaders is di¢ cult. Sec-
tion 4.1 discusses asymmetric information between leaders and their com-
munities. While competition between leaders could be seen as a solution we
show in section 4.2 that competition can backre. Economic restrictions are
discussed in section 5.
18Note that our model implies that two groups of equal size provide larger incentives for
leaders to engage in alienation. This connects our work to work on the role of polarization
in ethnic conict. See, for example, Esteban and Ray (1994) and Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005).
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4.1 The Role of Information
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the behavior of cultural leaders can harm their
community. One of the main reasons that the population can not defend its
own interest against the leader is a lack of information.
One way to see this is to assume that the true cultural values uii are known
to the respective population i but that the utility from a di¤erent culture
j is unknown to the population but known to the leader. In this situation
the leader will have an incentive to abuse her position and downplay uij:
However, not all claims that culture j leads to low welfare will be believed
and internalized by her group. One important restriction for the image of
culture j displayed by leader i is the past and present behavior of group j.
In such an environment corollary 1 enters with full force. Past and present
provocations by the outgroup become ammunition to feed low perceptions of
uij:
19 Violence, for example, creates new negative evidence against the group
and could therefore be used strategically to radicalize existing conicts.20
In an ethnic conict atrocities on both sides are used to strengthen group
identication.21
Religion provides a fascinating case of asymmetric information. It is
an element of many religions that the religious leaders provide a special
connection to a world of beliefs that cannot be known. Once this belief in
leaders is established the scope for abuse is almost innite. Holy scripts tend
to be guides of conduct approved by some supreme being leading to reward
if followed and punishment if violated. Historically, few people could claim
to be able to interpret the scripts, due to illiteracy or them being written in
a foreign language.
An extreme example is the Medieval Catholic church which used its re-
19Glaeser (2005) proposes a di¤erent model of conict in which politicians make up hate
messages and derives conditions under which the population does not check on stories they
are told by politicians. We see our model as complementary: our model shows that leaders
from both sides could actually have an incentive to cooperate in the creation of hatred.
The cost of the creation of hate stories in our model would depend on the extend they are
rooted in facts.
20Consider e.g. the September 11 attacks. The attacks increased prejudice (Kam and
Kinder, 2007, Hitlan et al, 2007 and Sheridan, 2006) and hate crimes against Muslims
and people of Middle Eastern origin (Oswald, 2002). The declared goal, less US military
intervention, was not achieved.
21For us the real issue is not that whether or not stories of violence and cruelty are made
up. What is fabricated by leaders is the link to the trait.
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ligious leadership to extract economic rents. An important aspect of the
position of the church was that Catholic priests had an informational advan-
tage22 due to the fact that the bible was only available in Latin. Therefore,
information about what was in the bible could not be contested. Accord-
ing to our theory this facilitated abuses because it meant that values of uij
were easier to manipulate. Indeed the Catholic church excessively used the
prospect of hell for a sophisticated system of rent extraction.23
The reformer Martin Luther strongly opposed these practices of the Catholic
Church. Interestingly, his remedy was a German translation of the bible. Ac-
cording to Luther the study of the bible was to lead to an universal priest-
hood of all believers.24 Copies of the text spread rapidly after 1517. Hence,
the Reformation not only meant "market entry" as in the interpretation of
Ekelund et al (2002) - which we discuss in the next subsection - but the
spread of translated text also broke the scope for manipulation which should
have changed welfare signicantly.
4.2 Competition among leaders
In the above model the existence of leaders is taken as given and leaders do
not have to worry about potential competitors. There are many situations
with these monopolies, where leader entry is institutionally restricted, where
leaders might manipulate these institutional rules in their favor and followers
have little or no inuence in appointing the leaders. In other situations
leaders have to worry about potential competitors which might constitute
a restriction to their behavior. Whether or not this limits abuses depends
on the nature and extent of competition. To see this point, consider two
di¤erent types of competition, internal competition where leaders compete for
the same trait and external competition due to the possibility of launching a
new trait. In what follows we will argue that only internal competition might
reduce the use of aggressive clash strategies while external competition will
intensify it. We also point to the limits of internal competition.
22Similarly, among Muslims the ulema (religious experts) class enjoyed a monopoly for
the interpretation of the Quran and the deeds and words of the Prophet Muhammed - the
hadith - for centuries. Knowledge was passed down through a chain of authorities or a
line of recognized masters (see Cesari, 2009).
23See Ekelund et al (2002) for a discussion.
24See Pelikan (2005). Becker and Woessmann (2009) show that Protestantism indeed
increased literacy.
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Internal competition would arise, for example if potential leaders can o¤er
and commit to "trait platforms" and are then selected by the population. If
parents foresee the consequences of their leaders choices correctly, internal
competition is likely to be an e¤ective tool to prevent abuses. However,
leaders do not have an incentives to silence any attempts of alienation. In
other words they might free-ride on existing radicals in the group. This
explains e.g. why terror organizations with a strong religious or cultural
emphasis are not easily condemned by leaders from their own culture. The
ambiguous relationship of Basque nationalistic leaders to ETA in the Spanish
democracy illustrates this point.
The entry of competing interpretations does not correspond to internal
competition but should rather be understood as external competition, where
the deviating interpretation corresponds to launching a new trade. This way
of creating competition is likely to lead to extreme positions as the incentive
to claim cultural superiority are amplied with rising competition. As shown
by Bisin et al. (2008) and Montgomery (2008) if there are more than two
cultural traits a positive utility loss in case of a trait change (ij > 0 for all
i 6= j) is not su¢ cient for cultural survival. Using the same assumption on
educational costs as in the present article, these papers show that the two
types with the highest utility loss in case of a trait change - the two most
"radical" types - survive but less radical types might become extinct. Hence,
successful entry of a new types requires either strong economic advantages
associated with the type or a high cultural dislike towards other types or
both.
This prediction is in line with some of ndings in the literature. Stark
and Iannaccone (2002), for example, argue that secularization in Europe (low
church attendance) is the result of low competition. Our model delivers an
interesting caveat. We argue that competition can lead to worse outcomes if it
is not based on increasing cultural value but increasing the fear of conversion.
An excellent illustration of this tension is provided by Abramitzky et al
(2009) who study the e¤ect of Christmas on Hanukkah celebrations by Jewish
families in the US. They show that the competition (Christmas) leads to
higher expenses by Jewish parents during Hanukkah. The e¤ect is strongest
for those parents who (have to) fear conversion of their children most, i.e.
expenditure on Hanukkah is higher in counties with a lower shares of Jews.
The Lutheran reformation discussed in the previous section provides an
additional illustration of external competition. Luther organized a new
church that cleverly used the old religion to provide cultural values and only
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introduced minimal changes. Moreover, he enhanced the cultural values by
introducing hymns, many of which he wrote himself. But he also instilled
cultural fear: salvation was only possible in the new faith. His intolerance
was very pronounced with the directly competing cultural traits, Catholicism
but also Judaism. He was more neutral towards Islam, a faith unlikely to
be adopted by his potential followers. Lutheranism arose as the only way to
escape hell.
The ulema class, scholars of Islamic law, also started to experience exter-
nal competition with the spread of secular education systems leading to the
birth of a Muslim intellectual class that claims to speak on behalf of Islam.
Nowadays the vast majority of the most inuential Muslim thinkers are grad-
uates from secular universities who do not belong to the ulema.(Cesari, 2009)
This competition among leaders which is facilitated by the modern commu-
nication technologies has coincided with the birth of more fundamentalist
and radical Islamic groups.
In a world where cultural categorizations are hard to avoid, leadership
competition is more likely to increase the use of aggressive clash strategies
than to decrease it. Mutual violence, for example, instead of leading to the
questioning of leaders, might allow leaders to emphasize cultural identities
and di¤erences even more. Moreover, emphasizing existing cleavages can
have the e¤ect to rally people behind their leaders.25 Toft (2007) argues that
this e¤ect can be so strong that religious symbols are adopted by political
leaders in civil wars to receive aid from outside.
5 The Role of Economic Opportunities
An interesting question is how the di¤erences in economic opportunities be-
tween the two traits a¤ects the warm glow leaders incentive for alienating
the outgroup. To answer that question we rst rewrite the equilibrium group
size of the economically advantaged group introducing (5) and (6) into (8)
as
q =
u11   u12 + w1   w2
u11   u12 + u22   u21 :
25The rally around the ag e¤ect is mainly studied for leaders involved in interstate
conict. See e.g. Baker and Oneal (2001) for rally around the ag e¤ects in the US and
Lai and Reiter (2005) for rally around the ag e¤ects in the UK.
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Note that the wage gap w1 w2 increases the size of q, i.e. it lowers the size
of group 2. Economic benets have a direct impact on educational e¤ort and
the spread of culture. By proposition 2 alienation is only used by su¢ ciently
large economically disadvantaged groups. If q increases due to an increase
in w1   w2 then u12 needs to increase to decrease q again. In other words,
a leader of an economically disadvantaged group has a lower "capacity for
alienation" (requires a higher u12) for any given u22. This comparative static
can be interpreted as a connection between economic well-being and cultural
arrogance. The better-o¤ a trait is relatively, the more alienating its cultural
leaders want to behave. This is in line with Chen (2010), for example, who
shows that the Indonesian nancial crises lead to an increase in religious
(Islamic) intensity. Since Islamic institutions provided insurance and the
possibility of consumption smoothing, the economic benets associated with
being a Muslim increased relatively and so did the size of the group.
One extreme form of cultural alienation is terrorism: terrorist attacks
might destroy cultural goods of the outgroup but will denitely lead to in-
creased dislike by the outgroup towards the ingroup. Consistently with our
above prediction Berman and Laitin (2008) present empirical ndings that
terrorist missions organized by radical religious clubs that provide benign
local public goods are more lethal than missions organized by other terrorist
groups with similar aims and theologies. According to our model this nd-
ing is due to the fact that leaders of these groups know that the group will
survive even strong negative pressures on their members.26
5.1 When alienation leads to economic discrimination
In addition to the level e¤ect described above economic opportunities could
also inuence the marginal incentives of cultural leaders. Take, for example,
an immigrant minority. If their leader successfully alienates the majority, it is
likely that this manipulation does not only a¤ect how much cultural dislike
the majority parents feel in case of a trait change of their child, but also
the economic opportunities of the members of the minority. In other words,
increased cultural fear might translate into increased discrimination.27
26Berman and Laitin (2008) argue that these groups have a technological advantage for
more lethal attacks. Our model explains why their leaders want to use lethal attacks in
the rst place.
27To take the extreme example of terrorism: Kaushal et al. (2007), Dávila and Mora
(2005) and Rabby (2007) nd signicant economic repercussions for Muslims and Arabs
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Can this reaction of the economic situation restrict leaders? To an-
swer this question we introduce an explicit link between wage discrimination
against the economically disadvantaged group and the cultural fear of the
economically advantaged group. Assume that
w1   w2 =  (u11   u12) (12)
where   0 measures how much cultural dislike translates into discrimina-
tion. Proposition 3 shows that the more group 2s economic opportunities
react to how it is perceived by group 1, the smaller is the scope for alienation.
Proposition 3 The optimal level of u12 (from the perspective of group 2s
leader) is increasing in .
Proof. See Appendix C
An interesting and surprising implication of Proposition 3 is that any pol-
icy that destroys the link between increased alienation and increased wage
di¤erences - instead of helping the minority - might backre because it in-
creases their leaders capacity for alienation. The presence of a secular leader
in our model who tries to maximizes the overall economic rents in society
by e.g. imposing institutional constraints on wage discrimination might have
this e¤ect. By reducing the economic disadvantage of group 2, this secu-
lar leader could make the cultural leader of the economically disadvantaged
group more aggressive.
A di¤erent reason why wage di¤erences might not react to alienation is
that group 2 has developed its own sub-economy that is independent of cul-
tural sentiments in group 1.28 Put di¤erently, economic interaction between
cultures can prevent cultural alienation. Our model therefore provides an
explanation for the well-documented link between economic integration and
good inter-cultural relations.29
Proposition 3 suggests that the cultural leader can be interested in isolat-
ing the minority economically. In Appendix D we discuss this possibility fur-
ther and show that cultural leaders of su¢ ciently intolerant minority groups
- groups with a su¢ ciently high level of cultural dislike towards the majority
living in the US and the UK following the 9/11 and London attacks.
28It is not uncommon that the minority develops an informal sector that relies on mi-
nority social networks for enforcement etc.
29For a review of the empirical literature see Rohner et al (2011).
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group - will always destroy economic integration. In doing so, they reduce
the size of their own group but benet from an increased education e¤ort
resulting from the possibility of higher alienation under economic isolation
of the minority group.
5.2 Cultural Diversity and Network E¤ects
The above analysis does not allow for any link between cultural diversity and
economic payo¤s. However, there are good reasons to think that such a link
exists.30 A simple way to model this in our framework is to assume that
economic opportunities improve with a function d = q(1  q) so that income
is highest at q = 1
2
: Cultural leaders who maximize group size will have the
tendency to drive society away from diversity while cultural leaders with
warm glow motivation have an intrinsic incentive to keep society culturally
diverse. However, the use of alienation to achieve this will harm welfare.
Diversity can harm welfare if a common culture facilitates economic in-
teractions (Lazear, 1999). A simple way to incorporate this into our model
is to allow for network e¤ects, i.e. economic benets increase with the size
of the group. Network e¤ects could be present in both cultural group or
only in the economically disadvantaged group. This latter interpretation is
especially relevant if group 2 represents an economically disadvantaged immi-
grant group where some of the economic benets depends on the immigrant
network, so that the new economic benets are w2 + e(1  q) where e is the
marginal network benet and w1 > w2 + e so that group 1 is always econom-
ically advantaged. Since the main function of one-side network e¤ects is to
reduce the economic disadvantage of trait 2, one-sided network e¤ects allow
warm glow leaders to increase cultural alienation.31 Matters are di¤erent if
network e¤ects are present in both groups, i.e. the economic benet of group
1 is
w1 + eq (13)
while the economic benet of group 2 is
w2 + e(1  q): (14)
30We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. For a survey on the positive
and negative e¤ects of ethnic diversity on economic policies and outcomes see Alesina and
La Ferrara (2005).
31A detailed analysis can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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In appendix E we show that small e make a warm glow leader of group
2 culturally less aggressive, i.e. she reduces cultural alienation (increases
u12) but the opposite happens once the network e¤ect becomes su¢ ciently
important. Nevertheless, the overall level of cultural alienation will always
fall short of the optimum without positive network e¤ects. The intuition of
the result is as follows. When network e¤ects are zero (e = 0), we are back to
our original model and the warm glow leader chooses the level of u12 optimally
such that qe=0 = 1
2
. With network e¤ects, the size of e > 0 and hence the
importance of network e¤ects do not only a¤ect the steady state group size
but also the perceived utility di¤erence between traits (1 and 2) directly
and indirectly through its e¤ect on the steady state. Importantly, a trait
change leads to a higher utility loss whenever ones group is in a majority,
and to a lower utility loss when ones group is in the minority compared to
the base line model. The overall utility loss from a trait change is increasing
in group size due to the positive network e¤ects. This drives the warm
glow leader towards less cultural alienation (increases u12) and hence bigger
group sizes. However, when the group becomes too big, free-riding starts to
dominate and the education e¤ort per group member falls, hence when the
network e¤ect becomes very important (e large) a warm glow leader wants
to increase cultural alienation but still wants its group to be a majority.
6 Salience and Identity
Our model focuses on one particular cultural trait and shows how the true
and perceived benets linked to the trait might be manipulated by cultural
leaders. An alternative approach is to argue that people have multiple iden-
tities and cultural leaders try to inuence the salience of these di¤erent iden-
tities. If this intensity of identication is a free choice32 then the inuence
of cultural leaders is small. However, there are good reasons to believe that
people can be pushed into certain identity roles against their will. The fol-
lowing account due to Sara Wajid, a Muslim journalist living in the UK in
the aftermath of the London terror attacks July 2005 illustrates this.
But most British Muslims have experienced the fetishisation of our reli-
gious identity over our citizenship - and are exhausted by it. A lower prole
32For models where individuals can choose freely among to di¤erent identities see Penn
(2008) and Shayo (2009).
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would be great. In fact, a return to the closet would be a blessed relief. I miss
the relative anonymity of being British Asian.33
When will cultural leaders stress cultural identities over citizenship? What
are their incentives to do so? Our model can be easily modied to address
these questions. Assume that there are two possible identities, one where
members of a society understand themselves (are seen) merely as "citizens"
and one where people see themselves (are seen) through a cultural identier
which separates people in group 1 and group 2. Society, in particular group
leaders, determine the intensity by which members of the society carry a
group identity which we call . To emphasize that might be forced upon
individuals we assume the same  for both groups. With these assumptions
the group 1 parent chooses the education e¤ort d1 which solves
max
d1
d1 (u11 + w1)+(1  d1) (q (u11 + w1) + (1  q) (u12 + w2))+(1  )u 1
2
d21
where where u is simply the cultural benet from a "citizen" identity.
Equivalently a parent of group 2 maximizes
max
d2
d2 (u22 + w2)+(1  d2) ((1  q) (u22 + w2) + q (u21 + w1))+(1  )u 1
2
d22
In this set-up motivation to educate rises in . This can be seen from the
motivational factor
01   (u11   u12) + w1   w2 (15)
and
02   (u22   u21) + w2   w1: (16)
The resulting equilibrium group size of the group 1 is
q =
 (u11   u12) + w1   w2
 (u11   u12) +  (u22   u21) (17)
It is easy to show that group size only increases in  if the group is
discriminated against in the labor market. Hence leaders with public good
motivation have an interest in raising  if and only if their group is econom-
ically disadvantaged.
33New Statesman 2009, p.
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We show in Appendix F that warm glow motivated leaders of both sides
have an interest in raising  for most parameter values.34 This consensus by
cultural leaders from both sides stresses - once again - the common interests
that arise due to leaders benetting from educational e¤ort of their group.
Interestingly, a rise in  might also benet the population. The reason is
that a cultural identity can give access to cultural goods that are not accessi-
ble with a simple citizen identity (uii > u). Driven by these benets, citizens
have a clear incentive to support the rise of . As before, incentives between
leaders and the community are aligned if cultural identities are characterized
by benets (high uii) not fear (low uij).
The resulting trade-o¤s for cultural leaders are best illustrated at the ex-
ample of immigrants in a largely ignorant and discriminating majority. In our
model, the negative judgements of the majority will be reected in an eco-
nomic handicap w1 w2. In other words, the survival of the immigrant trait
will be threatened. How can cultural leaders react? They may either exert
control over their members by encouraging them to conform their appearance
in order to minimize alienation and discrimination. The outcome would be
low values for  and the long-term decline of the trait if the strategy does not
bear fruits in terms of lower values for w1 w2 quickly. The alternative is that
leaders encourage their members to live their group identities strongly and
isolate them from the majority - at the potential costs of cementing the labor
market situation. According to Levinson (2003) the experiences of Jewish
Americans and African Americans in the early twentieth century illustrate
both of these strategies. Factions within each of these minorities attempted
to steer other members toward avoiding discrimination by assimilating or,
alternatively, militantly embracing group identity. Our model indicates that
strong cultural values (high u22) within these groups mean that minority
members might favor a solution with strong group identities.
7 Discussion
This article embedded the question of cultural conict into the economic
literature of cultural transmission of preferences. In our model, culture is
provided by cultural leaders who also shape its content. We show that in-
trinsically motivated leaders have an incentive to stress incompatibilities be-
34We show in the appendix that leader 2 always has an interest in raising : Leader 1
has an interest in raising  as long as group 1 is su¢ ciently large.
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tween their own and other cultures. More surprisingly, cultural leaders have
an incentive to raise sensitive issues to alienate other cultures. We show that
this behavior harms welfare. If outside and inside views on a culture diverge,
cultural education is increasingly driven by the fear of conversion rather than
the maintenance of positive values.
We present our model in terms of cultural transmission of preferences
from parents to children. This interpretation makes a lot of sense in our
main application, since inconsistencies in religious beliefs stand side by side
with individuals in di¤erent groups attempting to keep their children inside
their faith. However, the model could also apply to a possible future trait
change by the same individual. In this interpretation a person today ("par-
ent") chooses the cultural e¤ort to reduce the probability of a trait change
by the future self ("child"). This interpretation would be in line with Car-
valhos (forthcoming) model of veiling, where veiling is chosen to reduce the
probability of successfully being tempted towards non-Muslim values in the
future.
Our analysis studies the optimal manipulation by cultural leaders at
steady state but not on the dynamic transition path to steady state. The
latter exercise would require studying a dynamic game where forward looking
leaders fully take the dynamic e¤ects of their manipulation of cultural values
on the evolution of cultural values into account. While this is beyond the
scope of the paper, the present analysis can still give us some insights con-
cerning leaders incentives for cultural manipulation on the transition path.
The manipulation of ingroup cultural values immediately increases educa-
tional e¤ort and group size next period. Therefore, our ndings here apply
fully o¤ the equilibrium path.
The benets of alienation are a second order e¤ect, hence our equilibrium
analysis does not directly apply to the transition path. However, it is not
clear whether this eradicates the incentives to provoke other cultures. It is
possible that cultural leaders have an incentive to overshoot cultural alien-
ation on the transition path to speed up convergence to the new steady state,
since adjustment in education e¤ort lack behind adjustments in group size.
More importantly, perhaps, the fact that the e¤ect of alienation hits the
group members indirectly raises the di¢ culties of making leaders accountable
for welfare losses. This could explain why cultural conict is so hard to tackle
and calm.
Even if we accept the fact that there are pre-existing cultural identities,
it is important to di¤erentiate the image that cultures cast of themselves
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from the image that other cultures cast of them. It is in this di¤erence
in perceptions that the clash of civilizations can be observed and fought
productively.
References
[1] Abramitzky, Ran, Liran Einav and Oren Rigbi (2009) "Is Hanukkah
Responsive to Christmas?", The Economic Journal, 120, 612-630
[2] Alesina, Alesina and Eliana LaFerrara (2005) "Ethnic Diversity and
Economic Performance", Journal of Economic Literature, 43(2): 762-
800.
[3] Baker, William D. and John R. Oneal (2001) "Patriotism or Opinion
Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the "Rally Round the Flag"
E¤ect", The Journal of Conict Resolution 45(5) 661-687.
[4] Becker, Sascha and Ludger Woessmann (2009) "Was Weber Wrong?
A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History", Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 124 (2), 531-596.
[5] Berman, Eli (2003a) Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An
Economists View of Radical Religious Militia", NBER Working Paper
10004.
[6] Berman, Eli and Laitin, David (2008) "Religion, terrorism and public
goods: Testing the club model", Journal of Public Economics 92: 1942
1967.
[7] Berman, Paul (2003b) Terror and Liberalism, W.W. Norton. New York.
[8] Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2001) "The economics of cultural
transmission and the dynamics of preferences" Journal of Economic
Theory 97: 298-319.
[9] Bisin, Alberto, Giorgio Topa and Thierry Verdier (2008) "Cultural
Transmission, Socialization and the Population Dynamics of Multiple
State Traits Distributions" International Journal of Economic Theory
5: 139-154.
26
[10] Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Teresa Garcia-Muñoz and Shoshana Neuman
(2010) "The Big Carrot: High-stakes Incentives Revisited", Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making 23: 288313.
[11] Carvalho, Jean-Paul (Forthcoming) "Veiling", Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics.
[12] Cesari, Jocelyne (2009) "Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global
Islam", Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 8: 148-175.
[13] Chaney, Eric (2012) "Democratic Change in the Arab World, Past and
Present". mimeo. Harvard University.
[14] Chaney, Eric (2011) "Revolt on the Nile: Economic Shocks, Religion
and Political Inuence". mimeo. Harvard University
[15] Chen, Daniel L. (2010) "Club Goods and Group Identity: Evidence from
Islamic Resurgence During the Indonesian Financial Crisis, Journal of
Political Economy 118(2), 300-354.
[16] Cohen-Zada, D., 2006. Preserving religious values through education:
Economic analysis and evidence from the US,Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics 60(3), 372-398.
[17] Dávila, Alberto and Marie T. Mora (2005) "Changes in the earnings
of Arab men in the US between 2000 and 2002" Journal of Population
Economics 18: 587601.
[18] Ekelund, Robert , Robert Hébert and Robert Tollison (2002) "An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Protestant Reformation". Journal of Political
Economy, 110(3), 646-671.
[19] Esteban, Joan-Maria and Debraj Ray (1994) "On the Measurement of
Polarization" Econometrica 62(4): 819-851.
[20] Fox, Jonathan (2001) "Two Civilizations and Ethnic Conict: Islam and
the West", Journal of Peace Research 38(4):459-472.
[21] Glaeser, Edward L. (2005) "The Political Economy of Hatred", The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(1): 45-86.
27
[22] Gould, Eric D. and Esteban F. Klor (2012) "The Long-Run E¤ects of
9/11: Terrorism, Backlash and the Assimilation of Muslim Immigrants
in the West", CEPR DP 8797.
[23] Hammond, Ross and Robert Axelrod (2006) "The Evolution of Ethno-
centrism", Journal of Conict Resolution, 2006 (50), 926.
[24] Harbaugh, William, Ulrich Mayr and Daniel Burghart (2007) Neural
Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Char-
itable Donations. Science, 316, pp. 1622-1625.
[25] Hauk, Esther and Maria Saez-Marti (2002) "On the cultural transmis-
sion of corruption", Journal of Economic Theory 107: 311335.
[26] Hauk, Esther and Hannes Mueller (2011) "Cultural Leaders and the
Clash of Civilizations", Barcelona GSE Working Papers Series no 481
[27] Hitlan, Robert T. and Kimberly Carrillo and Michael A. Zárate and
Shelley N. Aikman (2007) "Attitudes Toward Immigrant Groups and
the September 11 Terrorist Attacks" Peace and Conict: Journal of
Peace Psychology 13(2): 135152.
[28] Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?", Foreign
A¤airs 72(3): 22-49
[29] Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Re-
making of World Order. Simon & Schuster. New York.
[30] Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris (2002) "Islam and the West: Testing
the Clash of Civilization Hypothesis", Comparative Sociology 1: 235-263
[31] Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris (2003) "The True Clash of Civiliza-
tions", Foreign Policy 135: 62-70
[32] Kam, Cindy D. and Donald R. Kinder (2007) "Terror and Ethnocen-
trism: Foundations of American Support for the War on Terrorism" The
Journal of Politics 69(2): 320338.
[33] Kaushal, Neeraj, Robert Kaestner and Cordelia Reimers (2007) "Labor
Market E¤ects of September 11th on Arab and Muslim Residents in the
United States", J Human Resources XLII(2): 275-308.
28
[34] Lai, Brian and Dan Reiter (2005) "Rally Round the Union Jack? Pub-
lic Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 19482001",
International Studies Quarterly 49, 255272.
[35] Lazear, E. (1999) "Culture and Language", Journal of Political Economy
107(S6): S95-S126.
[36] Levinson, D. J. (2003) "Collective Sanctions" Stanford Law Review 56:
345-428.
[37] Montalvo, José G. and Marta Reynal-Querol (2005) "Ethnic Polariza-
tion, Potential Conict, and Civil Wars," American Economic Review
95(3): 796-816.
[38] Montgomery, James, D. (2008) "Intergenerational Cultural Transmis-
sion as an Evolutionary Game", mimeo, Department of Sociology, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison.
[39] Oswald, Debra L. (2005) "Understanding Anti-Arab Reactions Post-
9/11: The Role of Threats, Social Categories and Personal Ideologies"
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 35(9): 1775-1799.
[40] Pelikan, Jaroslav (2005)Whose Bible Is It? A History of the Scriptures.
Penguin. New York.
[41] Penn, Elizabeth Maggie. 2008. Citizenship versus Ethnicity: The Role
of Institutions in Shaping Identity Choice.Journal of Politics 70:956
73.
[42] Rabby, Faisal (2007) "The Post-9/11 Labor Markets for Muslims in
the West Evidence from the USA and the UK" Working Paper De-
partment of Economics, Rutgers University.
[43] Rohner, Dominic, Mathias Thoenig and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2011) "War
Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conict," CEPR Discussion
Papers 8352.
[44] Sen, Amartrya (2006) Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny,
W.W.Norton & Comany, Inc. New York.
29
[45] Shayo, Moses (2009) "A Model of Social Identity with an Application to
Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution" American Polit-
ical Science Review Vol. 103, No. 2 May 2009
[46] Sheridan, Lorraine P (2006) "Islamophobia Preand PostSeptember
11th, 2001 " Journal of Interpersonal Violence 21 (3): 317-336.
[47] Stark, Rodney and Laurence R. Iannaccone (2002) "A Supply-Side Rein-
terpretation of the "Secularization" of Europe", Journal for the Scien-
tic Study of Religion, Vol. 33, 3, pp. 230-252.
[48] Toft, Monica Du¤y (2006) "Religion, Civil War and International Or-
der", BCSIA Discussion Paper 2006-03, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
[49] Toft, Monica Du¤y (2007) "Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of
Islam and Civil War", International Security 31 (4): 97-131
A Proof of Proposition 1
Note rst that the inuence of increasing u22 and lowering u21 for the cultural
leader goes only through increasing 2: The size of group 2 (1 q) increases
with 2 because
@q
@2
=   1
(1 + 2)
2 :
This immediately implies that a leader who maximizes groups size is inter-
ested in raising 2.
The derivative of (10) with respect to 2 is given by
@U2 (warmglow)
@2
=
@2q
 (1  q)
@2
= q (1  q) 2 1
(1 + 2)
2 (1  2q1)
= q (1  q) + (1  q) q (2q   1) > 0
Hence, religious leaders would always like to set the maximal di¤erence
u22   u21.
The utility of group 2 is given by
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U2 = u22 + w2   (1  d2) 2q   1
2
d22
or, in equilibrium,
U2 = u22 + w2   d2 +
1
2
(d2)
2 (18)
so that
@U2
@u21
=   @d

2
@u21
(1  d2) < 0
For a change in u22 the calculation is
@U2
@u22
= 1  @d

2
@u22
(1  d2) > 0:
because
@d2
@u22
= q   q (1  q) < 1:
In summary, group 2 always benets from an increase in u22 and su¤ers
from a decrease in u21:
B Proof of Proposition 2
Note rst that the inuence of decreasing u12 and increasing u11 for the
cultural leader of group 2 goes only through increasing 1: The size of the
group 2 (1  q) decreases with 1 because
@q
@1
=
2
(1 + 2)
2 > 0:
This immediately implies that a leader of group 2 who maximizes group size
is interested in lowering 1 and therefore never wants to lower u12.
The incentives of a warm glow leader can be studied by looking at the
derivative of (10) with respect to 1, namely
@U2 (warmglow)
@1
= 2 (1  2q)
which is positive for all q < 1
2
, hence a warmglow leader is interested in
decreasing u12 as long as q < 12 .
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The equilibrium utility of group 2 is given by (18) which can be rewritten
using equilibrium d2 = 2q
 as
U2 = u22 + w2  2q + 1
2
(2q
)2
Note that the change of utility with 2q therefore is
@U2
@2q
=  1 + 2q < 0
as 2q < 1:
Now we are ready to show that cultural alienation is not in group 2s in-
terest. Cultural dislike towards group 2 a¤ects the utility of group 2 through
2q
 = 12
1+2
as follows
@2q

@1
=
2 (1 + 2) 12
(1 + 2)
2
=
22
(1 + 2)
2 > 0
which means that
@U2
@1
< 0:
hence a decrease in u12 always harms group 2.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Using the assumed linked between cultural perception and wage discrimina-
tion stipulated by (12) we get the following fear of a trait change parameters:
1 = (1 + ) (u11   u12)
2 = (u22   u21)   (u11   u12)
1 + 

2 = (u11   u12) + (u22   u21)
The stable equilibrium is given by
q =
(1 + ) (u11   u12)
(u11   u12) + (u22   u21) (19)
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We will present our analysis by discussing when the leader of group 2
has an incentive to increase the cultural dislike of the outgroup towards the
ingroup. In general we dene
fi = uii   uij (20)
as the cultural dislike of group i towards group j. Using this denition a
warm glow leader of group 2 would like to increase the cultural dislike of
group 1 towards its own group as long as this increases her utility, namely
as long as
@U2(warmglow)
@f1
= q(1  q)@

2
@f1
+ 2 (1  2q)
@q
@f1
> 0 (21)
Using the equilibrium q dened by (19) and 2 = f2   f1 in the rst
order condition for the religious leader (21) we get after some algebra
@U2(warmglow)
@f1
=
2(1 + )
(f1 + f2)3

( f 21   f1f2(1 + 3) + f 22

We have to look at the sign of the square bracket only which is positive for
f1 < f

1 =
f2
2
p
(1 + 3)2 + 4  (1 + 3)

(22)
Hence the optimal level of cultural dislike towards the ingroup is given by f1
and we can show that
@f1
@
=
f2
22
"
1  1 + 5p
(1 + 3)2 + 4
#
< 0
Observe that u12 = u11   f1 , hence a higher f1 implies a higher capacity
of alienation, i.e. a lower perception of culture 2 by group 1 (u12). Since
@f1
@
< 0, the optimal u12 from the perspective of leader 2 is increasing in ,
reducing the optimal level of cultural alienation.
D A minority sector
In an environment where cultural dislike towards the minority group and
hence cultural alienation leads to more discrimination, the creation of a mi-
nority sector might benet the cultural leaders interest since it puts an upper
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bound to wage discrimination. If discrimination is too high, everybody will
move to the minority sector. Formally,
1 = (u11   u12) + w1  max fw2; w1    (u11   u12)g :
2 = (u22   u21)  (w1  max fw2; w1    (u11   u12)g)
wherew2 is now the wage in a separate minority sector whilew1  (u11   u12)
describes the wage of an integrating minority member, i.e. of a minority
member that works in the majority sector and is subject to wage discrimina-
tion. To save on notation we will work with the cultural dislike parameters
fi dened by (20).
This model has two equilibrium candidates:
1. In the rst candidate qS there is separation in the labor market and
cultural alienation does not have an e¤ect on discrimination. Since 2
is independent from f1 we know from the previous analysis that the
leader sets fS1 such that
qS =
fS1 + (w1   w2)
fS1 + f2
=
1
2
; (23)
hence
fS1 = f2   2(w1   w2) (24)
2. In the second candidate qI the labor market is integrated and cultural
alienation a¤ects the amount of labor market discrimination. Hence qI
is given by equation (19) namely by
qI =
(1 + )f I1
f I1 + f2
(25)
and the optimal fear level was derived in Appendix C as
f I1 = f

1 =
f2
2
p
(1 + 3)2 + 4  (1 + 3)

(26)
Observe that separation will never be an equilibrium if the minority
prefers to work in the discriminating majority sector for the optimal cul-
tural fear parameter of the separation equilibrium candidate fS1 . Similarly,
labor market integration will never be an equilibrium if at f I1 the minority
prefers the minority sector. If both equilibria are feasible the cultural leader
will implement the equilibrium that maximizes her utility.
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Proposition 4 The equilibrium outcomes are as follows
1. Labor market integration qI if the cultural dislike of the minority to-
wards the majority is low, namely
f2 <
1 + 2

(w1   w2) (27)
2. Labor market separation qS if the cultural dislike of the minority to-
wards the majority is high. In particular,
f2 >
2(w1   w2)p
(1 + 3)2 + 4  (1 + 3) : (28)
3. For intermediate levels of cultural dislike of the minority towards the
majority, namely
1 + 2

(w1   w2) < f2 < 2(w1   w2)p
(1 + 3)2 + 4  (1 + 3)
the religious leader will induce labor market separation qS whenever
(1 B)f2 > (w1   w2) (29)
and the integration equilibrium qI otherwise where B < 1 is dened by
equation (31). Moreover qI < qS.
Proof. We rst prove the di¤erent equilibria outcomes.
1. Let condition (27) hold and suppose for contradiction that separation
is an equilibrium outcome. Then the optimal fear level fS1 is given
by (24). The minority will indeed choose not to integrate if fS1 >
w1   w2. Replacing fS1 by its value this condition can be rewritten as
f2 >
1+2

(w1   w2) which contradicts condition (27).
2. Condition (28) is equivalent to f I1 > (w1   w2) hence the minority
will be better o¤ in the minority sector.
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3. When both equilibria are feasible it is easy to see that qI < qS since
qI > qS would require f I1 > w1 w2 which would induce the minority
to switch to the minority sector and make the integration equilibrium
disappear. To see which equilibrium is chosen by the leader we have to
compare the leaders utilities in the di¤erent equilibria, namely
US2leader = (f2   (w1   w2))
 
qS
  
1  qS
with
U I2leader =
 
f2   f I1
  
qI
  
1  qI
Using the equilibrium values for qI and qS we get
US2leader = (f2   (w1   w2))
1
4
U I2leader =
 
f2   f I1
(1 + )f I1
f I1 + f2

f2   f I1
f I1 + f2

=

f2   f I1
f I1 + f2
2
(1 + )f I1
where f I1 is given by (26)). If both equilibria exist the leader is better
o¤ in the separation equilibrium if US2leader > U
I
2leader or equivalently if
(f2   (w1   w2)) (f I1 + f2)2   4(f2   f I1 )2(1 + )f I1 > 0 (30)
Replacing f I1 by its value in (30) and rearranging we obtain condition
(29), where B is dened by
B =
2k (1 + ) (2  k)2
(k + 2)2
with k =
p
(1 + 3)2 + 4  (1 + 3)

hence
B =
2 ( + 1)
 p
92 + 10 + 1  (1 + 3)  3 p92 + 10 + 1 + 32 
 p92 + 10 + 1 + 12
(31)
Straightforward but tedious calculations show that B < 1:
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Proposition 4 tells us that only leaders of su¢ ciently intolerant (high f2)
minority groups will be able to destroy labor market integration. Since the
minority group will only be willing to work in the majority sector when there
is little cultural dislike by the majority towards the minority, the proportion
of the minority in the integrated labor market is higher than in the sepa-
rated labor market when both labor markets are possible. Hence inducing
the switch from the integration equilibrium to the separation equilibrium im-
plies that the leader will cash in the education e¤ort of fewer people. How-
ever, per capita education e¤ort will be higher because direct and oblique
socialization are cultural substitutes. Moreover, the e¤ect of cultural dislike
of the majority towards the minority is di¤erent in the integrated and the
separated labor market. In the integrated labor market cultural dislike of the
majority towards the minority has an additional e¤ect, namely it increases
wage discrimination and thereby reduces the attractiveness of being a mem-
ber of the minority. Once this e¤ect is gone due to a switch to the minority
sector, the marginal benet for the cultural leader of increasing cultural dis-
like towards its own group makes a jump which explains why labor market
separation might be optimal for the leader.
E Network e¤ects
If economic incentives in both groups partly depend positively on group size
as in (13) and (14), the perceived utility di¤erences i between trait i and j
from the point of view of a trait i parent are given by
1 = u11   u12 + (w1   w2)  (1  2q)e
2 = u22   u21   (w1   w2) + (1  2q)e
1 + 2 = u11   u12 + u22   u21
Using the fact that in equilibrium the fraction of individuals of trait 1 is
given by
q =
1
1 + 2
we can calculate the steady state fraction of trait 1 as
qe =
u11   u12 + (w1   w2)  e
(u11   u12 + u22   u21   2e)
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Dene fi = uii   uij. Hence
qe =
f1 + (w1   w2)  e
(f1 + f2   2e)
and we can rewrite 2 as
2 =
(f2   (w1   w2)  e) (f1 + f2)
(f1 + f2   2e)
Notice that 2 > 0 for all q requires e < f2   (w1   w2)
We want to understand the optimal choice of f1 of a warmglow leader
(which is equivalent to choosing u12 optimally for a xed u11). Given that
@2
@f1
=  2e @q
@f1
we get that
@U2(warmglow)
@f1
=
@q
@f1
(1  q) [ 2eq + (f1 + f2) (1  2q)]
Now
@q
@f1
=
f2   e  (w1   w2)
(f1 + f2   2e)2
> 0
So sign of @U
@f1
depends on sign of
 2eq + (f1 + f2) (1  2q)
=
 f 21   f1 (2 (e+ w1   w2)) + 2e2 + f 22   2 (w1   w2) (e+ f2)
f1 + f2   2e
and the optimal f1 is when this expression is zero, namely at
f e1 =   (e+ w1   w2) +
q
3e2 + f 22 + (w1   w2)2   2f2 (w1   w2)
To understand how e a¤ects this optimal choice we need to calculate
@f e1
@e
=  1 + 6e
2
q
3e2 + f 22 + (w1   w2)2   2f2 (w1   w2)
(32)
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which at
@f1
@e je=0
=  1
So weak network e¤ects make the leader less aggressive. But (32) changes its
sign from negative to positive at e > e= (f2 (w1 w2))2
6
. We can also calculate
when f e1 overtakes the optimal f1 without network e¤ects, i.e. when
  (e+ w1   w2)+
q
3e2 + f 22 + (w1   w2)2   2f2 (w1   w2) > f2 2 (w1   w2)
This is equivalent to
e > (f2   (w1   w2))
but this case is ruled out since such an e would lead to 2 < 0.
F Group Identities and Salience
We rst show that group size increases in salience if and only if the group is
economically disadvantaged. The derivative of the group size the economi-
cally advantaged group (17) with respect to  is
@q
@
=  (u11   u12 + u22   u21) (w1   w2)
2 (u11   u12 + u22   u21)2
and hence negative due to its economic advantage. If it were economically
disadvantaged it would gain in size from pronouncing cultural salience. How-
ever, for leaders with warm glow motives group size is not all that matters.
The benet of a warm glow leader of the economically disadvantaged group
changes with  according to
@U2(warmglow)
@
=
@ [02q (1  q) :]
@
= 02 (1  2q)
@q
@
+ q(1  q)@
0
2
@
=
(1  q) (u11   u12 + u22   u21)
(01 + 
0
2)
2  
2 (w1   w2)2 + 2 (u11   u12) (u22   u21) +  (u11   u12) (w1   w2)

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which is always positive since w1   w2 > 0.
For a warm glow leader of the economically advantaged group the benet
of changing  is given by
@U1(warmglow)
@
=
@ [01q(1  q)]
@
= 01 (1  2q)
@q
@
+ q(1  q)@
0
1
@
= q
 
2 (u11   u12) (u22   u21)  (u22   u21)  (w1   w2) + 2 (w1   w2)2
2 ((u11   u12) + (u22   u21))
!
which might have more than one solution for @U1(warmglow)
@
= 0. The state-
ment in the text, however, can be easily derived from setting u11 = u12. We
then have
01 = w1   w2
q =
w1   w2
 (u22   u21)
and
@U1(warmglow)
@
=   (w1   w2)
2
2 (u22   u21) (1  2q)
which is negative for all q < 1
2
and positive otherwise. The leader of the
economically advantaged group will resist an increase in  only if her group
becomes small and supports it otherwise.
We now show that the impact of  on the e¤ort of the economically
disadvantaged group is positive. For ease of notation we use our cultural
dislike denition (20) such that
f1 = (u11   u12) and f2 = (u22   u21) .
In equilibrium
d2 = 2q
 =
12
1 + 2
=
(f2   (w1   w2)) (f1 + (w1   w2))
 (f1 + f2)
=
2f1f2 + f2(w1   w2)  f1(w1   w2)  (w1   w2)2
 (f1 + f2)
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and therefore
@2q

@
=
(2f1f2 + (f2   f1) (w1   w2))  (f1 + f2)
( (f1 + f2))
2
 (f1 + f2) [
2f1f2 + f2(w1   w2)  f1(w1   w2)  (w1   w2)2]
( (f1 + f2))
2 :
which simplies to
@2q

@
=
2f1f2 + (w1   w2)2
2 (f1 + f2)
> 0:
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